Federal Court Remedies against State and Local Police Abuses:  Third Degree Practices Enjoined by Corcoran, Charles W.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 39 | Issue 4 Article 9
1949
Federal Court Remedies against State and Local
Police Abuses: Third Degree Practices Enjoined
Charles W. Corcoran
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Charles W. Corcoran, Federal Court Remedies against State and Local Police Abuses: Third Degree Practices Enjoined, 39 J. Crim. L.
& Criminology 490 (1948-1949)
CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS[
the strict limitations of the exceptions to the Character Rule. In
extending these exceptions the courts have discarded necessary safe-
guards against the indiscriminate use of this type of evidence. If not
strictly confined the prejudicial effect of this evidence will far out-
weigh its legitimate probative value. A fairer trial would be had if the
admissibility of other offenses were limited within the strict rules
formerly adhered to, and legislative aid were invoked to protect society
from this kind of sex offender. 34
RAY JUSTAK
Federal Court Remedies Against State and Local Police Abuses
("Third Degree" Practices Enjoined)
The case of Refoule v. Ellis' declares that use of "third degree" prac-
tices by state or local police violates the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and gives to the victim, against the offending
officers, an original right of action in a federal district court for injunc-
tion and damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1871.2 This statute
provides for civil action at law or in equity for any person who has
been deprived of any right secured by the Constitution and laws of
the United States by public officials acting "under color" of law.
An injunction of this nature against arrest of a suspect under a
valid state criminal law is unprecedented, as was the plaintiff's request
for a federal court to suppress the use of evidence at a state criminal
trial. The case presents important questions of the constitutional power
of a federal court to interfere, not simply by appellate review, but by
original action, with the right of a state to protect or punish its inhab-
itants. If valid the remedies involved in this case may become strong
weapons against use of the third degree for the following reasons.
Substantial damages against state officers are probably more readily
34 Minnesota has enacted a statute which comes fairly close to the type of conduct
presented by the "masher case." 2 Minn. Stat., c. 617, §617.08. "Indecent Assault.
Every person who shall take any indecent liberties with or on the person of any
female, not a public prostitute, without her consent expressly given, and which acts
do not in law amount to rape, an attempt to commit a rape, or an assault with intent
to commit a rape, and every person who shall take such indecent liberties with or on
the person of any female under the age of 16 years, . . .without regard whether he
or she shall consent to the same or not, . . . shall be guilty of a felony." For a dis-
cussion of the problem generally, and for a consideration of proposed statutory
enactments which embody certain provisions and desirable features lacking in the
:Minnesota statute, see (1948) 96 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 872.
1 74 F. Supp. 336 (N.D.Ga.1947). This case was the subject of a legal abstractin a recent issue of this Journal, (March-April, 1948) 38 J. of Crim. L. & Crim-
inology 121.
Coercion to force confession may be outright physical torture, or deprivation
of sleep, food or opportunity for bodily relief, with threats and intensive questioning,
as under arc lights, to destroy mental resistance. It is usually part of an incom-
municado and illegal detention, prior to arraignment. See In re Fried, 161 F. (2d)
453 (C.C.A. 2d, 1947) for recent bibliography on the subject.
2 "'Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws
of the United States, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 8 USCA




obtainable in federal than in state courts.' The injunction goes beyond
a writ of habeas corpus in that the latter can merely be used to pro-
cure release from an unlawful detention already in effect; it cannot
prevent repetition of the unlawful arrest. Nor can habeas corpus
prevent use of duress during'a lawful detention, which the injunction
can forbid. Perhaps the greatest significance of the use of the injunc-
tion against illegal questioning is that suppression of coerced evidence
seems to be legally consistent with, and even required by, the same
reasoning and authority which support the injunction. The possibility
of suppression of coerced evidence by a federal court would, of course,
be a tremendous deterrent of its use by state police.
In the Refoule case a French citizen, suspected of having murdered
his wife, had been four times taken from his home at unusual hours
by the defendant police officers of Atlanta, Georgia, and secretly
questioned for periods of eighteen to thirty-one hours. The first three
arrests were made without a warrant. On the fourth occasion a war-
rant was exhibited which charged him with sodomy,3 but before he
was finally, and for the first time, put in the county jail he was
detained for eighteen further hours of questioning, including subjec-
tion to seven lie-detector tests.4
After being released on bail, Refoule brought suit in the Federal
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, alleging that all
of these detentions had been carried on with intimidation, prolonged
questioning in relays, denial of counsel, and violence to his person to
coerce confession to uxoricide. After a hearing on motions to dismiss,
the court held that it was unnecessary to decide a conflict in the evi-
dence as to whether plaintiff had been phiysically intimidated or had
submitted to the questionings and lie detector tests voluntarily, on the
ground that the admitted circumstances of the lengthy and secret
interrogations constituted an "inherently coercive" situation, within
the formula of Asheraft v. Tennessee,5 which had violated the due
process of law guaranteed to plaintiff by the Constitution. It granted
a temporary injunction which restrained the police from further
arresting plaintiff without a warrant and from further questioning him
without counsel and against his consent. 6 The claim for damages was
reserved for trial. However, the court ruled against plaintiff's claim
for suppression of the statements allegedly extorted from him, holding
that the admissibility of evidence was exclusively a matter for the
criminal court to decide and therefore not determinable by a court of
equity. Plaintiff's request for an injunction against further intimida-
S This was an accusation apparently developed from the previous questionings,
during which Refoule had been several times confronted with certain young women
and a man, who had been similarly questioned. Written statements had been taken
from all. The inquisition regarding his private life seems to have been used as a
weapon of intimidation. No indictment ever issued against Refoule for murder,
but one was subsequently issued charging sodomy. Shortly after this decision sus-
taining the damages suit, the morals charge was dropped; and the damages suit
has not since been prosecuted. Atlanta Journal, June 17, Nov. 24, 1947.
4 SeeInbau, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation (2d ed., 1948) p. 94, for
discussion of admissibility of confessions elicited by use of lie-detector.
5 322 U. S. 143 (1944).
6 The court enjoined "the exercise of personal restraint over plaintiff by defend-
ants without a warrant or confinement without lawful arrest, and from further
questioning plaintiff without his consent after being afforded an opportunity of
consulting with his counsel." Refoule v. Ellis, 74 F. Supp. 336, 343, (N.D.Ga. 1947).
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tion of certain witnesses to produce evidence against him was sum-
marily denied because their rights were not personal to himJ
The motions to dismiss which the police officers filed alleged no jur-
isdiction, no power to grant the relief requested and no violation of
the Civil Rights Act. The court said that it clearly had jurisdiction
under the allegations of diversity of citizenship, denial of due process,
and violation of civil rights. Plaintiff was relieved of his duty to prove
the jurisdictional amount of $3000 by the counter-part of the Civil
Rights Act in the Judicial Code which exempts suits concerning civil
rights from the jurisdictional amount requirement.8 The emphasis of
the opinion indicates that the court really rested the jurisdiction on
the civil rights statutory basis.9 The court dismissed the contention
that there was no federal court power to grant the relief requested
by its finding that the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated,
which warranted use of the injunction, and by its finding that the
allegations of the complaint which were admitted in the hearing con-
stituted a violation of the Civil Rights Act, authorizing remedies under
that act.
Cause of Action under the Civil Rights Act'; Federal Right to
Lawful Trial
To establish his cause of action under the Civil Rights Act, Refoule
had to meet its two requirements. One is that there be a deprivation of
a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws of
of the United States, hereafter abbreviated to deprivation of a federal
right. The second is that the deprivation be effected under color of a
statute, custom or usage of any state or territory, referred to hereafter
as under color of law. The court was certainly correct in its finding
7 It would seem at least arguable that, if the police were attempting to force
untrue statements from the witnesses concerning plaintiff, he would have a sufficient
personal interest in preventing such police tactics to warrant protection by a court
of equity.
8 Diversity of citizenship and the presence of a federal question are grounds for
original jurisdiction in federal district courts only when the matter in controversy
exceeds $3000. 36 Stat. 1091 (1911), 28 USCA 41 (1) (1927);. 36 Stat. 1092
(1911), 28 USCA 41 (14) (1927). These provisions do not appear to be materially
altered by their replacements in the new Judicial Code, §§1331, 1332, 1343, 62 Stat.
- (1948).
9While Refoule was suing for $50,000 (Atlanta Journal, July 6, 1947), the
court neither mentioned this amount nor made any finding that the damages might
reasonably be found to exceed $3000. Assuming the jurisdictional amount require-
ment to be satisfied, speculation on whether the same results could have been reached
were the Civil Rights Act not in existence indicates the following ednelusions. As
a diversity suit, damages could be awarded by its being a common law action for
battery and false arrest. But if jurisdiction were through federal question (due
process), it is doubtful whether such acts would make state officers liable in damages
simply for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, without the special act of
Congress providing for such damages. In Bell v. Hoold, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), the
Supreme Court said that it was still an open question whether damages incurred
from violation of the Constitution (Fourth Amendment, illegal search and seizure)
could be recovered in a federal court against federal officers, without special provision
therefore by Congress. As to use of the injunction without reliance on the Civil
Rights Act, see infra notes 31 and 32.
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that the acts of the defendant police, though done in violation of
Georgia law,10 were under color of law."
A more difficult problem was the issue of whether or not Refoule
had been deprived of a federal right. In seeking to show constitutional
protection against the acts of the defendants, plaintiff could not look
directly to the Bill of Rights of the first eight amendments, which
were designed as protection only against action of the federal govern-
ment.' 2 Certain of the rights given in the first eight amendments,
however, have been held to be protected against state action by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, such as the rights to
freedom of speech, assembly and religion.' 3 As regards state criminal
trials, due process of law is interpreted by the Supreme Court as
requiring observance of those rights "so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. ' 14 It has
held the following to be among those rights: the right to counsel in
capital cases, 15 the right to counsel in non-capital cases under certain
aggravated circumstances,16 the right to a trial free from mob pres-
sure,17 the right to be free from deliberate use of perjured testimony,'8
the right to a public trial and a reasonable opportunity to the accused
to defend himself, including the right to examine witnesses against
him, and the right to offer testimony.19 In a long line of cases the
10 Georgia law provides: "An arrest for a crime may be made by an officer,
either under a warrant, or without a warrant if the offense is committed in his
presence, or the offender is endeavoring to escape, or for other cause there is likely
to be a failure of justice for want of an officer to issue a warrant." Georgia Code
(1933) §27-207. "In every case of an arrest without warrant, the person arresting
shall, without delay, convey the offender before the most convenient officer authorized
to receive an affidavit and issue a warrant. No such imprisonment shall be legal
beyond a reasonable time allowed for this purpose." Ibid. §27-212.
11 First established in Bx parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879), the rule is now
well settled that the act of a state officer done under cloak of authority given him
by the state, but beyond his authority and in violation of state law, is not merely
the unauthorized act of a private person. It is state action within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment; but the officer may be individually liable. Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1944). Such redress is not considered a suit against
the state within the prohibition of the Eleventh Amendment, since it is said that
the individual is not made a party as the representative of the state and that the
use of the name of the state to do an unconstitutional act cannot have the authority
of the state and, therefore, does not affect it in its sovereign or governmental capac-
ity. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908).
12 It has been urged in certain Supreme Court dissents that the rights therein
listed were considered to be among the "privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States," in the protection extended against state action by this clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948). See
Rotnem, "The Federal Right 'Not to Be Lynched' " (1943) 28 Wash.U.L.Q. 57,
urging that the founding fathers understood that the Bill of Rights was simply a
specification of the more important rights in the common law understanding of due
process of law, and taking the position that the federal government has always had
the constitutional power, independent of the Fourteenth Amendment, to prevent and
punish abridgment of fundamental rights by states and private personws (lynching
mob).
13 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) ; Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939);
Lowell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
14 Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425, 434 (1905).
15 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
16 Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
17 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
18 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) ; Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
19 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1947): Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S.-409 (1896).
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Supreme Court has held that use as evidence of a confession obtained
from the defendant by coercion violates due process of law.20
In one of the latter cases, Ashcraft v. Tennessee,2 ' the Supreme Court
established the well-known "inherent coercion" formula, in invalidating
a conviction obtained through the use of a confession made after the
suspect was secretly detained without warrant or arraignment and ques-
tioned continuously for thirty-six hours by relays of police, no physical
blows or threats having been proved. The Ashcraft case has been crit-
icized for being too indefinite since its coercion involved such a small
amount of physical torture or harm, but it has been followed in two
more recent cases, one being in 1948.22
The opinions in these confession cases induce belief that the acts of
torture in secret detention were themselves a deprivation of due process,
but it may be wondered if they sufficiently declared such acts themselves
to be a denial of due process to make them authority for the cause of
action in Refoule v. Ellis, where simply the coercion and not the use of
the statements at trial has occurred. This doubt is largely resolved by
the line of cases holding that coercion by arresting officers violates Sec-
tion 20 of the United States Criminal Code.23 This section subjects to
criminal punishment any one who, acting under color of any law, de-
prives any person of any rights secured by the Constitution. The word-
ing of the criminal section is almost identical with that of the Civil
Rights Act. It is to be construed in the same way.24 In these cases
acts of coercion to force confessions are considered as being in them-
selves a crime, regardless of whether or not a confession was obtained
or was used in prosecution.25
In the leading case of Screws v. United States Mr. Justice Douglas
spelled out the right with which these cases are concerned in the follow-
ing language: "It is plain that basic to the concept of due process of
law in a criminal case is a trial-a trial in a court of law, not a trial by
ordeal. "26 At this point in the Screws ease Mr. Justice Douglas cited
Brown v. Mississippi,27 which is significant in that, being in the Ash craft
20 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227
(1940); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
21 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
22 Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) (reversed conviction obtained
partially by use of confession made after two days' confinement incommunicado
in hotel room with persistent questioning); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948)
(all-night incommunicado questioning of 15 year old boy held denial of due process,
invalidating conviction obtained by use of confession as evidence). See review of
recent United States Supreme Court decisions concerning involuntary confessions
in Note (March-April, 1948) 38 J. of Crim. L. & Criminology 627.
23 "Whoever, under color of any law, . . . wilfully subjects . . . any . .. in-
habitant .. . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
. ..by the Constitution and laws of the United States .. . shall be fined not
more than $1000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both." 35 Stat. 1092
(1909); 18 USCA 52 (1927).
24 Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 151 F. (2d) 240, 248 (C.C.A. 3d, 1945) ; Burt
v. City of New York, 156 F. (2d) 791, 792 (C.C.A. 2d, 1946).
25 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (sheriff arrested young negro,
charging theft of a tire, and beat him to death) ; Gulp v. United States, 131 F. (2d)
93 (C.C.A. 8th, 1942) (sheriff and others arrested various persons on false charges
and extorted "fines" by harsh treatment and illegal detention); United States v.
Sutherland, 37 F. Supp. 344 (N.D.Ga.1940) (police officer convicted for threats
and assaults on negro boy in effort to extort confession to a theft).
26 325 U.S. 91, 106 (1945), cited note 25 supra.
27 297 U.S. 278 (1936), cited note 20 supra.
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line of cases invalidating convictions obtained by use of the confessions
at trial, its employment in the Section 20 prosecution of the Screws case
indicates that it would also be correct to use the formula of the Ashcraft
case to determine what is sufficient coercion to deny due process-inde-
pendent of any use of a coerced confession at a trial. This in turn
enables application of the Ashcraft formula to such civil causes of action
as Refoule v. Ellis, to which decision it was essential. 28
In addition to the Section 20 cases, 29 it should be noted that in the
cae of In re Fried,30 discussed below, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the circumstances there alleged, of the same type of
coercion as that of the Ashcraft case and of Refoule v. Ellis, would, if
proved, constitute a case of violation of due process, warranting pre-
vention of any legal use of evidence so obtained.
Injunction
Assuming the correctness of this conclusion that Refoule had been
deprived of a federal right, and therefore had a valid cause of action
for damages under the Civil Rights Act, it would seem that the court
was also correct in issuing an injunction, the defendants having as-
serted that they had the right to continue to harass the plaintiff to
force confession. Injunctions have many times been issued by federal
courts against state officers to protect other federal rights, both prop-
erty and civil rights.3 1 Having before it'a right previously recognized
in other situations to be within the due process clause, there was no
reason why the court could not extend the well-established injunction
remedy to protect it. The fact that this injunction interferes with a
state's exercise of its police power cannot alter the correctness of the
court's action. No power of the state can authorize violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and such violation can be forestalled by a one-
judge federal district court where it is not the constitutionality of the
state statute that is in question but only the constitutionality of par-
ticular acts of enforcement.3 2
28 Important also because to date United States v. Sutherland, 37 F. Supp. 344
(N.D.Ga.1940), cited note 25 supra, is the only successful conviction under 18 USCA
52 where the deprivation of the federal right was solely the intimidation to coerce
a confession, and that case was decided by the same judge as in Refoule v. Ellis,
nor was it appealed.
29 It should be noted that the criminal statute contains the word, "1wilfully,"
creating a difficulty for conviction not present under the Civil Rights Act here
involved, in which the absence of that word indicates that the cause of action is
satisfied by a deprivation of a federal right in fact, whether or not done "wilfully. :
30 161 F. (2d) 453 (C.C.A. 2d, 1947).
31 Mitchell v. Dakota Telephone Co., 246 U.S. 396 (1918) (district court held
to have power to enjoin impairment of contract by state officers in violation of
Article I, §10, of the Constitution); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (injunction
issued against arrests by municipal officers in violation of the rights to freedom
of speech and assembly); Burt v. City of New York, 156 F. (2d) 791 (C.C.A. 2d,
1946) (injunction and damages for denial of equal protection of the laws); Alesna
v. Rice, 69 F. Supp. 897 (D.C. Hawaii 1947) (Norris-LaGuardia Act right, to picket
protected by injunction). See Moskovitz, Civil Liberties and Injunctive Protection
(1944) 39 Ill. L. Rev. 144.
32 In recognition of the injunctive power, and to restrain its summary use by
a single judge to supersede acts of state legislatures, Congress passed a law in
1910 which provided that the enforcement of a state statute should not be restrained
by any district court on the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless
the application therefore was heard and determined by a district court of three
judges. 36 Stat. 539 (1910), 28 USCA 380 (1928). The complete wording of this
law seems to make it quite clear that a distinction was made by which a single
1948]
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If not viewed simply as part of a course of conduct unconstitutional
because of coercion,33 it would seem that the court was incorrect in
enjoining arrest of plaintiff without a warrant.3 4 A position that
merely arrest without a warrant was unconstitutional would result in
an excess of cases under the Civil Rights Act, and it is a position not
well supported by precedent.3 5 In support of his conclusion that he
had authority to forbid detention by state officials without a warrant,
the court in Refoule v. Ellis cited the Georgia statutes prohibiting arrest
without a warrant, and two cases: Anderson v. United States,36 and
McNabb v. United States.37 But both these cases were prosecutions for
federal crimes, involving illegal detention by federal officers. They were
decided on the basis of federal rules for the admission of evidence, under
the Court's supervisory power over federal prosecutions. Neither stated
that an arrest by a state officer without a warrant was a violation of
due process.3 8 That injunction of arrest without a warrant could not rest
on breach of Georgia law is illustrated by the statements of Mr. Justice
Douglas in the Screws case: "There is no warrant for treating the ques-
tion in state law terms. The statute does not come into play merely
because the federal law or the state law under which the officer purports
to act is violated. It is applicable when and only when someone is de-
prived of a federal right by that action." 3 9
Similarly it would seem that the court was correct in enjoining
denial of counsel only if regarded as one of the component features of
this particular "third degree" course of conduct. For denial of counsel
is not necessarily a violation of due process even at trial.4° And it seems
that pre-trial denial of opportunity to consult with counsel is depriva-
tion of due process only where the fairness of the trial is affected.41
district judge has power to enjoin enforcement of a state statute where it is the
method of enforcement and not the statute itself which is attacked as unconsti-
tutional. The law was reenacted in the new Judicial Code. 62 Stat. - (1948).
28 USC 2281. See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Oglesby, 198 F. 153 (D.C.Mo.1912)
(a federal court of equity may grant relief where a valid state law is unconstitu-
tionally administered and irreparable injury is threatened). Accord, Gully v. Inter-
state Natural Gas Co., 292 U.S. 16 (1934) (validity of the statute must be attacked
to require three judge court).
33 Cf. Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc. 312
U.S. 287 (1947) (injunction permitted to be extended to prohibit acts, normally
within the rights of the union, because of previous course of violent conduct).
34 The court said that "detention without a warrant is generally unlawful and
defendants therefore proceeded in disregard of plaintiff's constitutional rights."
Refoule v. Ellis, 74 F. Supp. 336, 342 (N.D.Ga.1947).
35 The best authority for this proposition is given by Picking v. Pennsylvania
R' Co., 151 F. (2d) 240 (C.C.A. 3d, 1945), in which arrest without a warrant under
color of state law was named as the-federal right for a suit for damages under the
Civil Rights Act. But since this issue was complicated by the fact that the plaintiff
had been denied the writ of habeas corpus, and had also been transported interstate
under color of extradition proceedings, the case is not good authority for a position
that simply arrest without a warrant is a denial of due process.
36 318 U.S. 350 (1943).
37318 U.S. 332 (1943).
38 In fact, in the McNabb case Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out that the
Court was not passing on the due process aspect of the arrests because it did not
wish to make a rule which would be applicable to state arrest cases. id at 337.
39 325 U.S. 91, 108 (1945).
40 Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948) (due process clause does not prohibit a
state from accepting a plea of guilty in a non-capital case from an uncounseled
defendant).
41 Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940). But see English case, Cox v. Coleridge,
1 B. & C. 37 (1882).
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Suppression of Coerced Confession
The court decided the important issue of plaintiff's request for sup-
pression of the alleged extorted statements in a single sentence, simply
saying that equity was without power to pass on the admissibility of
evidence in a criminal case. It cited one case, Eastus v. Bradshaw, 2
decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 1938.
It thus failed to consider the significant factors present in Refoule v.
Ellis which were not present in the situation dealt with in Eastus v.
Bradshaw. In Eastus v. Bradshaw the statements sought to be sup-
pressed had been yielded under the threats of income tax agents, ap-
parently merely oral threats not accompanied by such an extended and
intensive amount of physical and mental coercion as to constitute a
denial of due process. In Refoule v. Ellis there had been such a viola-
tion of due process. Secondly, Eastus v. Bradshaw apparently did not
involve a threatened criminal indictment. In any event neither that
court nor that of Refoule v. Ellis considered the irreparable damage to
reputation consequent of a false indictment for crime based solely on a
coerced confession.
The important case of In re Fried43 placed these objections to the deci-
sion in the Refoule case on the suppression issue beyond the level of
speculation. In this case the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that circumstances of Ashcraft-type coercion violated due
process, that an erroneous indictment grounded only on a coerced con-
fession would cause irremediable damage, and that where these two
factors were present there was a right to suppression of such evidence
by a federal district court. Eastus v. Bradshaw had treated the sup-
pression of the statements there involved as merely a problem of the
administration of federal criminal justice, stating this in terms Qf tradi-
tional limitations on the power of equity. Judge Learned Hand would
have liked to settle the Fried case on this basis but felt that the consti-
tutional issue controlled, and that equity's power to fully protect the
plaintiff's constitutional rights included the power to suppress evidence
unconstitutionally obtained. The decision of the court in that case was
a clear holding to that effect. It would seem that the instant court
should have decided Refoule v. Ellis on the basis of In re Fried (which
had been decided earlier in 1947 but apparently not brought to the
court's attention) and not Eastus v. Bradshaw, since it had been able
to grant the injunction and to retain the cause for trial as to damages
only because of its finding that the plaintiff had been deprived of his
constitutional right to be free from coercion applied to force a con-
fession.
That Refoule v. Ellis involved state officers and state crimes instead
of federal officers should not make any difference, since constitutional
rights were at stake, and state criminal proceedings have many times
been enjoined in their entirety to prevent irreparable damage through
a denial of federal rights.44 Suppression is interference only with one
42 94 F. (2d) 788 (C.C.A. 5th, 1938), cert. den. 304 U.S. 576.
43 161 F. (2d) 453 (C.C.A. 2d. 1947), cert. granted 331 U.S. 804 (1947), writ
dismissed on motion of petitioner, 332 U.S. 807 (1947). Note (January-February,
1948) 38 J. of Crim. L. & Criminology 509.
44 Tuchman v. Welch, 42 F. 548 (C:C. Kan. 1890) (plaintiff was the victim of
harassment by repeated arrests and indictments for violation of Kansas liquor laws,
despite his interstate commerce rights under the original package doctrine; injune-
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